Warmatrix

Erich von Manstein planning Operation Citadel, 1943 CE

Erich von Manstein was one of the finest operational commanders of World War II, though not as great as he would have the world believe through his post-war writings.
Von Manstein was born in 1887 CE as the tenth child of the Prussian artillery general von Lewinski, adopted and raised by the von Manstein family. Both families had their roots in military Prussian aristocracy and the young Erich was steeped in military culture and education. He joined the army when he was 13 years old. In 1913 CE he attended the Prussian war academy, though was forced to break off his study with the outbreak of World War I.
As a lieutenant von Manstein served on both the western and eastern fronts. As early as 1914 CE a bullet wound put him out of action for a half a year. On his return he was promoted to captain and served as a staff officer, again on several fronts, learning to plan and conduct operations.
When the German army was reduced 100,000 men at the end of the Great War, von Manstein was one of 4,000 officers who remained. In the interwar years he served in several staff positions, taught military history and tactics and rose to the rank of colonel. In 1935 CE he became a member of the army general staff and teamed up with officers like Heinz Guderian. When the latter's vision of panzer forces proved too radical for the conservative elite, von Manstein managed to have them adopt the Sturmgeschütze self-propelled assault guns.
In 1939 CE, von Manstein, now a major general, played an important part in planning the invasion of Poland. His first great moment came in a year later, in the west. The first versions of the plan for the German attack on France were slightly revised versions of the Schlieffen plan from World War I. Adolf Hitler wanted a faster, more aggressive attack. Von Manstein, Guderian and several others devised a 'sickle cut' maneuver that met this demand. Despite opposition from the army high command, they managed to push it through with support from Hitler. The plan, though risky, worked very well and boosted the prestige of all those involved tremendously; it earned von Manstein promotion to general.
When Operation Barbarossa was launched in 1941 CE, von Manstein was made commander of a panzer corps and involved in the Battle of Leningrad. He displayed great tactical flexibility and made many prisoners. In September he was reassigned to Army Group South and tasked with conquering the Crimea, including its capital Sevastopol. Despite lacking in tanks and air support, his army took the Crimea within a few weeks, though Sevastopol still stood. A Soviet counterattack threatened to overwhelm Hans von Sponeck's division in the eastern half of the peninsula, which escaped, defying von Manstein's orders. The latter drove the Soviets back again, but also wrecked von Sponeck's reputation in a streak of pettiness. He then subjected the city to an old fashioned siege, employing massive artillery railguns. In the summer of 1942 CE, after an amphibious assault, Sevastopol finally fell and saw its conqueror promoted to field marshal.
Afterwards von Manstein was briefly assigned to Leningrad again, then was sent south to rescue the 6th army, which was locked up in Stalingrad after Georgy Zhukov's counteroffensive. Here he made one of his largest mistakes, by advising Hitler that 6th army need not break out and could be relieved instead. Von Manstein tried what he could, but the forces allocated were no match for the Soviets and he had to break off the attempt. The Red Army launched another offensive, which nearly broke the German southern front. Von Manstein skillfully retreated his forces and when the Soviet advance became overstretched, hit back hard and recaptured the city of Kharkov. This was probably the best operation of his career.
In 1943 CE the field marshal was made responsible for the southern arm of the German offensive near Kursk. The attack failed, though von Manstein, who had received the best SS panzer divisions, came close to a breakthrough. He believed that he had scored something of a victory, but underestimated the power of the USSR to replace its losses. During the rest of the year he launched limited attacks to keep the Soviets off guard. Despite that he could not withstand the Soviet advances of the last years of the war. More and more he came into conflict with Hitler, who issued a stream of 'stand fast' orders. On several occasions von Manstein retreated his armies to prevent them being outflanked and destroyed. In early 1944 CE this saved Army Group South from destruction. However Hitler did not like commanders who disobeyed his orders and in in April dismissed von Manstein.
Von Manstein was intelligent, an accomplished bridge and chess player who was always thinking several moves ahead. As a commander, in maneuvering his armies, he displayed the same qualities. Most of the time he struck a perfect balance between directing battles and delegating details to his officers, resulting in great tactical flexibility. At other times he blocked all dissent from his directives, like the infamous treatment of von Sponeck at the Crimea. His strategic insight was less than his tactical brilliance; throughout World War II he underestimated Soviet strength.
After the war von Manstein denied involvement of the Wehrmacht in the nazi warcrimes, claiming that it was the responsibility of Hitler and the SS. In fact he and his officers were fully aware of them, but turned a blind eye and in many cases actively participated. In 1949 CE, in a British war trial, he was sentenced to 18 years in prison, but served only 4, due to chronic eye problems and lobbying by friends. Afterwards he was involved organizing the new western German army, the Bundeswehr, and wrote his memoirs, with which he boosted his personal reputation. He died in 1973 CE.